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Introduction 
Nuclear proliferation, especially to or by terrorist groups, is commonly regarded as one of the 
greatest, if not the greatest, threats we and other governments face. Yet the enormous difficulties 
confronting terrorists who wish to acquire, maintain, and then deploy a nuclear weapon or device 
suggest that the more likely threat is one posed by a state that either uses such a weapon or 
makes it available either to other governments or to a terrorist group.[1] This point also applies to 
the procurement of possible biological weapons by terrorist groups where again dependency on 
the state plays a large role in obtaining the necessary materials.[2] And if we are to judge from 
the analogy of the greatly hyped discourse on biological weapons proliferation and the wildly 
over-inflated assessments of the likelihood of biological warfare and especially such warfare 
perpetrated by terrorists using advanced bioweapons, the likelihood of terrorists acquiring and 
using nuclear weapons by themselves may also be comparably overstated, especially in view of 
the difficulties involved in obtaining, storing, preparing, and using both kinds of weapons.[3]  
Therefore at present it seems like the most likely route of proliferation is by states to states or by 
agencies connected with a state to another state. Indeed, recent examples of proliferation like 
North Korea’s construction of a reactor for Syria that was clearly intended for military purposes is 
an example of the phenomenon by which one state opens the way to another to become a 
nuclear power.[4] Likewise, Syria and North Korea in this and other cases have used their own 
state-run illicit programs to fund these programs or to acquire the materials necessary to sustain 
them.[5] Similarly Syria and Iran’s transfer of weapons to Hezbollah exemplifies the pathway by 
which a state might enable terrorists to obtain desired military capabilities, be they conventional 
or nuclear. Therefore the likelihood of such pathways to nuclear and/or missile proliferation 
remains quite high for several reasons. Historically no state to date has been able to develop 
nuclear weapons on its own except for the United States, the first nuclear power. Either they stole 
the secrets as in the Soviet case, or they had help from other states as in every other case, 
including the DPRK-Syrian connection. And today due to the revolutions in international affairs 
occasioned by the end of the Cold War and globalization governments’ structural incentives to go 
nuclear and their ability to obtain needed materials from the permanent members of the Security 
Council or from other nuclear powers have increased considerably.[6]  
Neither are terrorist groups the only non-state organizations implicated in terrorism. As part of 
globalization, states and groups like A.Q. Kahn’s “import-export” ring, or nuclear Wal-Mart 
(depending on your preference) have proliferated, forging links among governments and 
businesses operating in established states.[7] Thus the new nuclear powers can, and in 
Pakistan’s case, have been conduits of further proliferation. Khan’s operation almost certainly 
grew out of and may well have remained in large measure a Pakistani state enterprise (in all 
senses of the term) throughout its duration.[8] Moreover, even the public announcement of this 
operation did not lead to its breakup or to Pakistan’s quest for nuclear technologies (which apart 
from their use in Pakistan could then be resold elsewhere) from other countries. Indeed, that 
quest for foreign technologies, notably Russian ones, continues.[9] Thus Bruno Tertrais 
concludes that, while the Khan network is unique, its efficiency resided largely in its being based 
on a state network. Today computers can now replace much of the work that sophisticated 
engineers had to do and poorer countries can download the software for making the metal alloys 
needed for this work. But even so, no new network is conceivable without state sponsorship 
based on actual experience of directing a national nuclear program. Therefore we can expect that 
if such a network develops it is likely to be a North Korean or Iranian one.[10] And the North 
Korean reactor that Syria commissioned exemplifies the process, especially as it is now claimed 
by the CIA that Syria could have used the reactor to produce fuel for 2 nuclear weapons.[11]  
Consequently just as the means or pathways for procuring and then developing nuclear materials 
have expanded so too has the number of states who are nuclear capable grown. American 
estimates talk of 35-40 states that have a latent nuclear capability (knowledge, technology and 
materials) that could easily be enhanced through participation in open civilian nuclear energy 
programs even as they have parallel clandestine military programs.[12] As a result, 
In a world characterized by high nuclear latency, a number of risks stand out. One is simply that 
there may be multiple ways for states to be considered nuclear-capable. While robust nuclear 
weapons programs remain the most serious proliferation danger, a range of possibilities below 
this threshold or level of capability must be of concern as well. So must be models of weapons 
development enabled by technologies and processes that may be easier to conceal and harder to 
detect (for example laser enrichment).[13] 
In this context, A.Q. Khan’s operation may come to be seen not as an anomaly but as a harbinger 
of the future.[14] At the same time, Khan’s operation could not have flourished without the quite 
visible cooperation of European suppliers and foreign governments who suspected what was 
going on but looked the other way. Thus his operation confirms the necessity of foreign help for 
governmental proliferators even as it also could have become the conduit of nuclear materials 
and secrets to terrorists. Khan’s operation is thus an exemplar and possible precursor of 
secondary or even tertiary proliferation that goes beyond transferring capabilities to terrorists to 
denote the process whereby new or recent nuclear powers facilitate further nuclearization among 
other states. Something of this sort may be happening, e.g. in the DPRK’s and Russia’s relations 
with Myanmar where both states are evidently assisting Myanmar’s quest for nuclear power if not 
weapons.[15] Secondary and tertiary proliferation also exists with regard to missiles and delivery 
systems. Thus in 2006 Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander of Iran’s elite clerical Army, the 
Pasdaran, disclosed that Iran has “no prohibitions or reservations” about providing missile 
systems to “neighboring and friendly countries.” Indeed, Tehran considers it a duty to help other 
friendly countries that “are exposed to invasion of the Zionist regime.”[16] 
Thus we see a proliferation of pathways to proliferation. Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba 
denote three particular pathways. First comes latent proliferation by which a county maintains a 
façade of compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while covertly developing weapons 
capabilities as North Korea and Iran have done. Second is “first-tier proliferation” where material 
stolen or bought from private firms and/or state nuclear programs assist proliferators in 
developing weapons and delivery systems. And third comes what we have called secondary or 
tertiary proliferation, which they call second tier proliferation or proliferation rings where 
developing countries with varying degrees of capability assist other such states with their 
proliferation programs. Pakistan’s relations with North Korea, Iran and Libya, and North Korea’s 
ties to Syria exemplify this form of proliferation.[17] At an earlier stage China’s ties to and support 




Our focus here is on the second of these pathways, specifically the Russian one. As we shall see, 
within this category of pathways from the Russian state to proliferators who then do what they 
please, there are then several branches by which Russia might contribute to proliferation, either 
as a matter of policy or inadvertently. In an age of multiplying demand for nuclear materials, 
technology and know-how where the supply is considerably more constrained than is the demand 
and possibly becoming more so due to nonproliferation pressure from a U.S.-led coalition, the 
abundant supply of all these components in Russia makes it a tempting source of what 
proliferators need. Furthermore, for reasons described below the environment in Russia is all too 
permissive for launching such proliferation efforts. In this context the abundance of nuclear 
material in Russia, the apparently still inferior means for guarding it and the visible nonchalance 
of the Russian regime regarding proliferation raise several red flags. Indeed, as we shall see 
below, officials, if not the government as a whole, have in the past and may still be colluding to 
transfer materials, know-how, or technology to proliferating states. Therefore these red flags 
should go up for several reasons.  
The first of these branches to proliferation is the rather self-serving and self-seeking Russian 
nonchalance about proliferation relative to other states’ concerns about the problem. Russian 
analysts and officials habitually claim that Russia and the United States share a common interest 
in nonproliferation and that Moscow opposes either Iran or North Korea obtaining nuclear 
weapons. Therefore if America will take Russia’s advice and recognize its equities in these issues, 
a political solution will ultimately come about that defuses the problem and is a win-win 
arrangement.[19] However, the reality is rather different. First, Moscow’s approach to proliferation 
is explicitly instrumental and based strictly on expediency, i.e. an approach where national 
interest, coldly asserted, takes precedence over all other considerations. It is driven by Russia’s 
traditional support for cold-blooded Realpolitik and by its own concept of its “sacro egoismo” 
(sacred egotism) as an independent actor whose independence and full sovereignty is the alpha 
and omega of its foreign policy actions. Furthermore Russia’s full and unconstrained freedom to 
do as it pleases must first be respected by everyone else as a starting principle in their 
relationships with them. Danish General Michael Clemmesen, the Commandant of the Baltic 
Defense College, wrote in his blog analyzing the cyber-attacks in Estonia of April-May, 2007 that, 
The attitude of Russia to the world and especially to its neighbors is presently close to that of the 
great power attitudes of that earlier [pre -World War I-author] period. It is built on a demand for 
‘respect’ for the country because of its size. It is rooted in the geostrategic and geopolitical 
attitudes tainted with Social Darwinism that dominated the conservative elites of all other major 
European states of the period. (Italics in original),[20] 
This approach governs Russia’s real approach to proliferation which is rather different than this 
somewhat idealized view. For example, in early 2002 Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told us 
what the motive forces of Russia’s approach to proliferation issues are, i.e.,  
Russia scrupulously adheres to its international obligations in the sphere of non-proliferation of 
mass destruction weapons, means of their delivery, and corresponding technologies. The key 
criteria of Russian policy in this sphere are our own national security, the strengthening of our 
country’s international positions and the preservation of its great power status.[21] 
Thus Russia evaluates proliferation issues not according to whether the regime is democratic or 
not as in America, but on the basis of whether a country’s nuclearization would seriously threaten 
Russia and its interests.[22] Therefore, threats to the nuclear order or to the global or regional 
balance as such are not directly relevant to its calculations. If proliferation benefited Moscow, it 
would probably find ways to support it even if it formally had to pose as an opponent. For 
example, Robert Einhorn testified in 2006 to the Senate that, 
Russia, which a year ago said it couldn’t provide nuclear fuel to India’s Tarapur reactors because 
of its Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) obligations, recently sent a large fuel shipment to those 
reactors, arguing (over the objections of most NSG members) that it was entitled to do so under 
the NSG’s “safety exception.”[23]  
Thus, in commenting on the June 2007 proposal by President Putin to let the Americans jointly 
manage the Russian missile defense radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, Russian chief of Staff, General 
Yuri N. Baluyevsky stated that, Washington’s claim that Russia now admitted to an Iranian threat 
was a misinterpretation. While Russia never denied a global threat of nonproliferation of missiles 
and nonproliferation, “we insist that this trend is not something catastrophic, which would require 
a global missile defense system deployed near Russian borders.”[24] Western analysts have 
picked up on this as Russian officials have told them that there is no reason to stop Iran because 
Iran’s activities drive up the price of oil to Russia’s benefit. As Ariel Cohen of the Heritage 
Foundation has observed, 
If this is the case and Iran goes nuclear with Russian help, it changes the prognosis for the oil 
prices. It changes the ability of Iran to block exports of oil from the Persian Gulf. It may change 
the global economic situation. And Russia, of course, benefits because Russia is a high price oil 
exporter.[25] 
Likewise others speculate Russia makes cooperation with the West against Iranian nuclearization 
dependent upon potential commitments to refrain from enlarging NATO to include Ukraine and 
Georgia or from “meddling” in the CIS.[26] Thus Russia privately threatened Washington and 
NATO that if they went ahead with a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine (MAP) at the 2006 
NATO Riga summit, it would drastically retaliate, including arming Iran against the US. 
Conversely if Washington suspended the offer of membership Russia might then become much 
friendlier on the Iranian issue.[27] This example underscores the fundamentally short-sighted and 
self-seeking Russian policy towards Iran and toward proliferation threats more generally.  
Another favorite line of argument is that Western tactics of “state terror” are a major contributing 
cause to their resolution to keep seeking the bomb forcefully preventing would-be proliferators 
from obtaining the bomb. And while we should be concerned about the instability of many states 
who seek the bomb, that instability is itself often the result of misguided Western policies.[28] 
Therefore, 
The attempts to prevent forcefully someone from possessing the nuclear potential will only lead to 
simpler nuclear technologies and increased access to them, up to their possession by self-
proclaimed states and nongovernmental organizations. In fact it is what represents the main 
threat, but is directly connected with the need for nuclear weapons that is created by the policy of 
restricting sovereignty of weak countries.[29] 
This logic leads, of course, to still more justifications for nuclear proliferation as this writer, 
Anatoly Baranov the editor of FORUM.msk openly admits. Thus, he writes “By the way, this is yet 
another reminder for Ukraine on the need to reactivate in good time its own nuclear program.”[30] 
Another popular refrain is that American concern to limit missile and technology transfers to 
potential proliferators is merely an attempt to oust Russia from profitable markets for its wares, 
and replace it by American exporters. Therefore since this is all self-seeking competition, 
American complaints can and should be dismissed on those grounds.[31]  
In other words, while Moscow opposes proliferation, it does not regard it too seriously as a threat 
unless it goes to enemies. And in any case it will not do much about the problem, leaving it up to 
America to take the lead only insofar as it grants Moscow the respect it craves and abdicates 
from interfering in regions close to Russian interest. Moreover, since Russia starts its foreign 
policies with the presupposition of enemies, most notably America, anything that seems to 
threaten American interests like Iranian and North Korean proliferation is not something for it to 
worry too much about. Instead they are opportunities for Russia to advance its agenda/s. Alexei 
Arbatov’s recent assessment cogently outlines Russia’s approach to proliferation and its posture 
on the issue. As Arbatov notes, 
For Russia the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan and 
the prospects of further proliferation are adding some new elements to a familiar and old threat, 
rather than creating a dramatic new one as is the case with the United States. The USSR and 
Russia have learned to live with this threat and to deal with it on the basis of nuclear deterrence, 
some limited defenses (like the Moscow BMD system and national Air Defenses) and through 
diplomacy, which is used to avoid direct confrontation (and still better, to sustain normal relations) 
with new nuclear nations.[32] 
Other analysts second this notion that Russia’s response to Indo-Pakistani proliferation was a 
low-key one and point out that for Russia the United States was and in many quarters still is 
regarded as the only or most likely potential adversary.[33] Instead Moscow regards vertical 
proliferation (qualitative improvement) as opposed to horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons 
to new states with greater alarm than does the United States. Russia’s posture thus reverses 
America’s which takes greater alarm at horizontal proliferation.[34]  
So while nuclear and missile proliferation are serious Russian security issues, and even more so 
because of its geographical proximity to all existing and potential third nuclear weapon states, 
Russia does not profess undue alarm at this trend. Unlike America it advances no claim to be a 
global “policeman,” does not deploy military sites or armed forces abroad (except in some post-
Soviet states) and does not employ its forces in serious combat operations. Thus it avoids 
challenging other countries, including actual or potential nuclear and missile-capable regimes. 
Due to Russia’s vulnerability and lack of reliable security protection and commitments from other 
nations its non-proliferation stance is much more cautious and flexible than that of the USA. 
Moreover, given Russia’s post Cold War weakness it has been forced to confront other security 
threats that are incomparably more urgent to it than proliferation.  
Among those threats are these listed by Arbatov:  
• The instability and bloody conflicts across the post-Soviet space and in the North 
Caucasus of Russia proper (which has a 1,000 km common border with the volatile 
South Caucasus).  
• NATO’s continuous extension to the east against strong Russian objections.  
• Continuing stagnation of Russian armed forces and defense industries and Russia’s 
growing conventional and nuclear inferiority to the United States and NATO.  
• The threat of expanding Muslim radicalism in the Central Asia (7,000 km of common 
border with Russia).  
• The scary growth of economic and military power of China (5,000 km of common border 
with Russia).  
• Recently, the plan of the deployment of U.S. BMD sites in the Czech Republic and 
Poland and the pressure of Washington in favor of accepting Ukraine and Georgia to 
NATO have moved to the forefront of Moscow’s security concerns.[35] Arbatov further 
observes that,  
There is a broad consensus in Russia’s political elite and strategic community that there is no 
reason for their nation to take U.S. concerns closer to heart that its own worries - in particular if 
Washington is showing neither understanding of those problems of Russia, nor any serious 
attempts to remove or alleviate them in response for closer cooperation with Russian on non-
proliferation subjects.[36] 
This does not mean that Russia simply ignores the threat of proliferation. President Putin told a 
BBC interview in June 2003 that: "If we are speaking about the main threat of the twenty-first 
century, then I consider this to be the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction." He then spoke about the same subject at the session of the UN General Assembly 
on September 26, 2003.[37] Russia also exercises control over foreign economic operations with 
nuclear materials, special non-nuclear materials and corresponding technologies, as well as dual-
use goods and technology, principally as a component of the policy of non-proliferation. The 
Export Control Law, adopted in 1999, has locked in the term "Export Control" specifically for this 
sphere. In the 1995 Law on national regulation of foreign trading activities, Export Control was 
described as the full set of measures for the implementation of a "transfer procedure" for agreed-
upon goods, technologies and services. The 1999 law codified this term as "foreign trading, 
investment, and other activities, including production cooperation in the field of the international 
exchange of goods, information, work, services, and results of intellectual activities, including 
exclusive rights to them (intellectual property)." This means not only the export of goods and 
technologies abroad, but also their transfer to a foreigner within the territory of the Russian 
Federation. In January 1998, the Russian government introduced rules for "all-encompassing 
control" (catch-all).[38]  
As Arbatov also observes, unlike America, Russia does not view North Korea and Iran as 
potential enemies. Iran also occupies the second or third place (depending on the year) among 
buyers of large lots of Russian arms, which has helped the military-industrial sector to survive in 
spite of limited defense orders for the Russian armed forces for many years. Finally, Iran is an 
extremely important geopolitical partner of Russia's, a growing “regional superpower” that 
balances out the expansion of Turkey and the increasing U.S. military and political presence in 
the Black Sea/Caspian region, and simultaneously contains Sunni Wahhabism’s incursions in the 
North Caucasus and Central Asia.[39] Thomas Graham, formerly of the National Security Council, 
concurs in this assessment of Iran, seen from Moscow as the dominant regional power in the 
neighobrhood who can project power into the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the Persian 
Gulf. Therefore Moscow values Iran’s refraining from doing just that by its pro-Iranian policies.[40] 
Russian diplomats confirm this evaluation of Iran’s importance to it. T hus Gleb Ivashentsov, the 
then Director of the Second Asia Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry, told a Liechtenstein 
Colloquium on Iran in 2005 that: 
Iran today is probably the only country in the greater Middle East that, despite all of the internal 
and external difficulties, is steadily building up its economic, scientific, technological, and military 
capability. Should this trend continue, Iran—with its seventy million population, which is fairly 
literate, compared to neighboring states, and ideologically consolidated, on the basis of Islamic 
and nationalist values; with a highly intellectual elite, with more than eleven percent of the world’s 
oil and eighteen percent of natural gas reserves; with more than 500,000 strong armed forces 
and with a strategic geographic position enabling it to control sea and land routes between 
Europe and Asia—is destined to emerge as a regional leader. This means that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran will be playing an increasing role in resolving problems not only in the Middle 
East and Persian Gulf area but also in such regions that are rather sensitive for Russia as 
Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Caspian region. This is why dialogue with Iran and 
partnership with it on a bilateral and regional as well as a broad international basis is objectively 
becoming one of the key tasks of Russia’s foreign policy.[41]  
Therefore Russia’s nuclear policies towards Iran according to Graham aim at gaining insight and 
thus leverage upon Iran’s overall nuclear energy program, e.g. through its ability to control the 
tempo of supply of nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor.[42] Russian nuclear exports are also 
much more important to its economy than are nuclear exports for the U.S. economy. Indeed, 
Russia, like other major powers is feverishly competing with them to sell its reactors all over the 
world thereby opening up potentially new proliferation possibilities.[43] As Arbatov indicates, 
Among Russian exports (predominately oil, gas, and other raw materials) nuclear contracts relate 
to only a few types of high-technology products (beside arms sales) that are competitive on the 
global market. This is deemed an important high added-value component of the export structure 
and a matter of status of an advanced participant in the world trade.[44] 
Thus he and many other observers agree that we must not underestimate the role of internal 
factors in Russian policy. Because the Ministry of Atomic Energy (now the Federal Atomic Energy 
Agency) has been chronically under-funded for the purposes of maintaining, converting and 
dismantling its nuclear legacy from the USSR, income from sales to China, India, Iran, and other 
countries are indispensable for life support of this immense social and technological organism. In 
turn, ROSATOM is playing an important role in the formulation of the technical and economic 
facets of Moscow’s actual policy on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear power plant 
construction contracts, in particular in Iran.[45]  
Given these aforementioned considerations we may describe Russia’s position regarding 
proliferation as does Arbatov, namely:  
• Russia has an interest in enhancing the non-proliferation regimes, but this is not the main 
priority in its foreign policy or security strategy.  
• Russia views with a lot of skepticism the global strategy of non-proliferation and counter-
proliferation declared by the United States, seeing in them a policy based in the practice 
of double standards and an attempt to veil other political, military, and commercial 
interests, including nuclear exports, with the goal of non-proliferation.  
• Russia is not inclined to sacrifice its own economic and political interests in peaceful 
nuclear cooperation with other countries for the sake of the abstract non-proliferation 
ideal (especially in the United States’ unilateral interpretation). It will not initiate any 
further tightening of the regime (especially one associated with economic losses), while 
at the same time observing the letter of the provisions of the NPT, IAEA safeguards, and 
agreed-upon norms for nuclear exports.  
• Relations with the United States are of considerable significance for Russia (including 
CTR and GNEP programs) and it is prepared within certain limits to take U.S. demands 
into account.  
• At the same time Moscow will resist Washington’s pressure to abandon its dealings with 
other countries that are legal from the standpoint of the NPT, even if these countries at 
this point in history are not to the liking of the current U.S. administration and even if 
there is suspicion about the military nuclear proclivities of Russia’s foreign partners. In 
this sense, the continuation of the Bushehr project and its possible expansion have 
gained not only practical significance for Moscow ($5 billion in income), but a sense of 
principle and political significance as well.  
• Russia will object, as will the majority of U.S. allies, to using force to resolve non-
proliferation problems (although for political considerations it has supported the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI), and will give preference to diplomatic and 
economic instruments in reinforcing the NPT. Russia has supported recent UNSC 
resolutions on Iran and [the] DPRK but will resist “hard sanctions” (i.e. oil embargo, 
cutting communications etc.) and will veto the use of force.  
• Russia’s non-proliferation policy (just as defense and arms control postures) will probably 
stay passive and mostly reactive, except when promising direct economic benefits (as 
with the multilateral uranium enrichment plant in the Siberian city of Angarsk). Without 
initiatives from outside, Russia would hardly initiate or readily endorse more strict export 
controls, embargoes on sales of nuclear fuel cycle components or more intrusive IAEA 
guarantees. However, it may use nuclear and missile proliferation as a pretext for 
withdrawing from some treaties, foremost the INF-SRF Treaty of 1987, apparently 
motivated by other military and political reasons.[46]  
Not surprisingly, we see this nonchalance in the current concrete proliferation issues of the day, 
namely North Korea and Iran. In the North Korean case, even though North Korea is on Russia’s 
border and its activities have already stimulated a missile, if not missile defense race in East Asia, 
Moscow has displayed a visible Schadenfreude (joy at another’s sorrow) directed against 
America when North Korea tested missiles and then a nuclear weapon in July and October 
2006.[47] At the same time, Russian officialdom views Washington’s general insistence on 
nonproliferation controls as merely or mainly an effort to pressure competitors in the nuclear and 
arms markets.[48] A recent analysis of Russian reactions to the February 13, 2007 six-party 
agreement on North Korean denuclearization strongly suggests the continuation of this 
misanthropic view. 
Moscow’s reasoning on the February 2007 deal conflicts with that of the Bush Administration: 1) it 
came about as a result of the United States correcting its past mistaken diplomacy; 2) it is likely to 
fail because the United States will not fulfill its commitments; 3) the talks serve as a model of 
multilateralism, applying pressure only in extreme need through unanimous Security Council 
resolutions and encouraging diplomacy in which officials having good ties to all parties play the 
decisive role; and 4) at fault is a U.S. worldview that demonizes the North Korean regime in order 
to justify a strategy of global hegemony. Given this line of reasoning, Russians are inclined to 
interpret ambiguities in the timing of mutual steps in carrying out this deal as U.S. attempts to 
gain one-sided advantage.[49] 
Russia’s position on Iran is even worse in spite of the fact that Russia cannot plead ignorance of 
this threat. Indeed, it is entirely possible that Moscow does not want there to be a solution to 
Iran’s challenge as some observers have noted. Specifically, 
At the same time, a political solution of the Iranian nuclear issues is in conflict with Russian 
strategic interests. If the problem is settled, Russia will not be able to use it as a bargaining chip 
in the relationship with the West. What is more, the dispute is only likely to be settled if, instead of 
the current extremist regime, moderate pro-western, political and economic groups come to 
power. In that case Iran may go back to being an American partner. This would be against 
Moscow’s expectations and its strategic stance. The Kremlin is interested neither in a nuclear-
armed Iran, nor in ending its nuclear program.[50] 
Prominent Russian generals still, and quite mendaciously given Russia’s publicly voiced 
apprehensions about Iranian missiles, deny that Iran represents any kind of missile threat.[51] 
They do so, of course, to inveigh against U.S. missiles defenses in Central Europe. Putin’s recent 
interview with Le Monde, given as Prime Minister of Russia, demonstrates Russia’s efforts to 
have it both ways with regard to proliferation and Iran. Thus his statements allow him and the 
Russian government to claim that it opposes proliferation and has counseled restraint upon Iran, 
while supporting it and blithely denying that it is building nuclear weapons. 
I don’t think the Iranians are looking to make a nuclear bomb. We have no reason to believe this. 
The Iranian people are very proud and independent. They are trying to implement their legal right 
to develop peaceful nuclear technologies. I should say that formally Iran hasn’t violated any rules. 
It even has the right to carry out enrichment. It only takes a quick glance at the relevant 
documents to confirm this. There were some claims that Iran hadn’t revealed all its programs to 
the IAEA. This is what we need to clear up. But to a large extent Iran has revealed its nuclear 
programs. I repeat there is no official basis for legal claims against Iran. But I have always openly 
told our Iranian colleagues that we take into account that Iran is not isolated in a vacuum, but in a 
very dangerous and volatile region.  They should keep this in mind and avoid aggravating their 
neighbors and the international community, and should take steps to convince the international 
community that they have no secret plans. We have worked in very tight cooperation with our 
partners in Iran and within the framework of the six-party talks, and we will continue to do this in 
the future. We are against—this is our principle - we are against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. We think it’s a very dangerous trend. And most importantly it’s not in the 
interest either of Iran or the region as a whole. Because the use of nuclear weapons in such a 
small region as the Middle East is nothing short of suicide. In whose interest could a nuclear 
bomb possibly be used? Palestine? If nuclear weapons were used, Palestine would cease to 
exist. We remember the Chernobyl tragedy—all it takes is for the wind to blow in the wrong 
direction, and that’s it! Who could possibly benefit from this? We think it’s counter-productive. 
This has always been our position and I hope this opinion will be shared by President Medvedev. 
We will use any means possible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.[52] 
We should contrast these carefully chosen pro-Iranian words with earlier statements to U.S. 
audiences by high-ranking Russian defense officials who told U.S. analysts, that if Iran gets 3000 
centrifuges, as the IAEA now admits Iran to have, it could have the required nuclear material for a 
bomb in 18 months.[53] By that reckoning Iran should have a bomb by 2009-10. Although high-
ranking Russian government and military officials regularly claim that Iran poses no threat and 
does not have the capability to threaten either Europe or Israel with nuclear missiles, in fact they 
themselves know this claim to be false. Some Russian generals have even admitted as much. 
And both Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and former Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky 
have acknowledged it.[54] Yet d espite the fact that is military knows full well that Iran is 
developing nuclear and missile capabilities that can threaten Russia itself as well as it neighbors, 
military leaders and the government persist in publicly denying the existence of such a threat.[55]  
But Moscow still seeks to mitigate, if not avoid, sanctions on Iran. It also is trying to get the other 
members of the “sextet “(America, England, France, Germany, and China) to give Iran security 
guarantees to induce it to stop enrichment and proliferation activities and is telling Iran that while 
it supported UN mandated sanctions, that these are not serious threats. And it is doing so in spite 
of the fact that Iran has publicly maintained that it will continue defying UN resolutions (and all this 
comes form a power that never fails to make its point about the alleged superiority of the UN as a 
security manager).[56] Obviously Iran’s expectation that Russia will shield it from serious threats 
while it continues to build its nuclear weapons and does so relatively unscathed, and that Iran will 
derive considerable benefits form its association with Russia still holds water.[57]  
Indeed, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the NIE’s findings of December 2007 to say that 
Russia has no evidence that Iran was conducting research for a nuclear military program before 
or after 2003 as Washington had previously asserted.[58] Even more bizarrely he has stated that, 
that U.S. missile defense plan for Eastern Europe not only aims at deterring Russia (which is 
utterly false), he also argues that it is intended to replace the Iranian regime.[59] Even though 
Moscow now urges Iran to cease enrichment and heed the mandate of the IAEA, it still falsely 
claims that Tehran is undertaking such cooperation. Thus Russia and Iran are, according to 
President Putin, stepping up cooperation, Lavrov reportedly offered Iran a strategic partnership in 
November 2007 that would include lifting of all sanctions and prevention of new ones, and a 
treaty on arms sales plus cooperation in economics, energy, and even space. Apparently it would 
entail as well joint cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus as aspiring security managers of 
those regions. Furthermore, such partnership would mean that Russia views any encroachment 
on Iran’s interests as constituting and encroachment upon its own interests.[60] Lavrov also 
complains hat the West’s refusal to acknowledge Iran’s positive gestures towards the IAEA are 
leading to the isolation and estrangement of Iran which, in turn, hinders clarification and 
resolution of all the issues pertaining to Iran’s nuclear program.[61]  
Lavrov has even repeatedly argued since then that “Iran deserves to be an equal partner of all 
regional countries in the resolution of the problems of the Near and Middle East.”[62] He has also 
proposed a similar involvement of Iran in Black Sea security issues![63] Deputy Foreign Minister 
Alexander Losyukov has also recently indicated that Moscow is resubmitting not only Iran’s but 
also Pakistan’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This last point, 
concerning Pakistan marks a new departure and a concession to China, as well. Presumably the 
quid pro quo would be Chinese support for Iranian, and maybe Indian membership.[64] Thus 
Russia returns Iran’s earlier favor and seeks to promote its standing throughout the entire Middle 
East and Central Asia. Similarly Nikolai Bordyuzha, the Director of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO-Moscow’s defense alliance in Central Asia) has recently said that Iran could 
be invited to join the CSTO thus giving it a voice in the defense of Central Asia under Russian 
supervision. Moreover, any use of force by Washington in Iran would threaten this organization’s 
remit, i.e. security in Central Asia.[65]  
Despite Russian denials, there also appears to be a plan to upgrade Russian arms sales to Iran 
of S-300 anti-air missile defense systems to make any foreign air strikes on Iran more difficult. 
Meanwhile it has begun sending nuclear fuel to the reactor at Bushehr as part of its policy to gain 
nuclear footholds throughout the Middle East, claiming that the fact that Iran is buying this fuel 
and is supposed to return spent fuel to Russia shows that Iran has no ‘objective need‘ for 
generating its own nuclear fuel or for enriching uranium. Even so Iran merely pockets the fuel and 
moves forward.[66] However, as Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni notes, Moscow’s supplying of 
nuclear fuel to Iran while it enriches uranium is “inconceivable” given the threat that Iran poses to 
Russia and all the former Soviet republics should it achieve the bomb.[67] In fact at least some 
Russian commentators have wondered aloud whether or not Russia’s efforts to tie Iran to it are in 
fact leading to it being tied to Iran or at least embarked upon a process that it cannot truly 
control.[68]  
Amazingly Lavrov has said that, that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a threat to international 
order whereas Iranian nuclearization would not be such a threat.[69] Other analysts, like the 
Carnegie Endowment’s Dmitri Trenin, say that Iran is a nuclear problem in waiting but Pakistan is 
a clear and present concern if not danger.[70] 
Here again the explanation is pure Realpolitik, namely the search for partners against America in 
the Gulf who would allow Russia to claim again that it truly is a great power, the need to forestall 
Iranian based threats to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and economic opportunities. 
Thus there has been no change in Russian policy since Ivashentsov (now Ambassador to Seoul) 
uttered his anlaysis. On April 30, 2008 President Putin delivered a message to the Iranian 
government through the Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Vlaentin Sobolev stating that, 
“Russia confirms the principles of mutual relations with Iran and her policy will not depend on who 
is in power.” Sobolev further added that Russia’s and Iran’s positions on major regional and 
international issues “are very close and compatible”. Moreover Iran has a right to obtain peaceful 
nuclear technology (a right that is not in question, what is at issue is Iran’s systematic deception 
of and prevarication to the IAEA-Author). Lastly Sobolev said that Russia wiill promptly fulfill all its 
obligations in regard to the nuclear reactor at Bushehr.[71] Until today, however, Iran has 
continued to defy UN resolutions about enrichment, is generating more centrifuges and is 
engaged in an ongoing and massive covert effort to obtain missile technology abroad.[72]  
Russia’s nuclear policy does not stop with Iran and North Korea. Not surprisingly, Moscow has 
gone beyond helping Myanmar acquire nuclear energy, it also is seeking other worlds to conquer 
in the nuclear sphere and exploiting its ties to Iran to acquire economic benefits and political 
influence by offering nuclear power to hitherto non-nuclear states who clearly have no need for it 
other than as an an attempt to counter or perhaps ultimately deter Iran. Thanks to Iran’s 
increasingly undisguised military nuclear program and conventional rearmament 13 Sunni Arab 
nations are seeking some form of nuclear power.[73] And Russia is ready, willing, and able to 
provide many of them with nuclear reactors and know-how.[74] These are not the actions of a 
state that takes the specter of proliferation too seriously.  
Neither is this “nonchalance” about proliferation the only reason why Russia should remain a 
state of concern to us with regard to proliferation. Indeed, there are several reasons why Russian 
behavior on proliferation issues raises concerns. First, Moscow consistently behaves as if it were 
in a state of denial regarding its sale of dangerous military systems abroad once it becomes clear 
that they could be used. A consistent line of defense against criticisms of the sale of conventional 
weapons or of nuclear technologies is that American complaints are purely cynical and that all it 
really wants to achieve is to oust Russia from a profitable market so as to take it over itself. Thus 
in regard to Azerbaijan’s blocking of Russian nuclear technologies earmarked for Iran, Moscow 
claimed that this was done for “political reasons.”[75] Likewise, in 2006, despite massive Israeli 
proof of Russian weapons being diverted from Syria and Iran to Hizballah, Russian officials 
derided these claims as nonsense even though its is quite unlikely that Moscow did not know 
what the ultimate provenance of its weapons would be.[76] Thus because of the personal, 
economic, and political interests of the exporting agencies involved as well as the government 
(subject that is further touched on below) and their individual leaders who have a well-known 
pecuniary interest in arms and nuclear technology sales Russia invariably first replies to such 
charges by offering a stiff denial and/or accusation of the bad faith of the accuser, behind which 
lies a strong determination not to admit the truth either to itself or to others about such deals.  
The large-scale deals that Russia, through Gazprom, is negotiating with Iran for access to Iranian 
fields or to supply the projected Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI also play a very large role in 
shaping Russian policy because this involvement gives major Russian political actors a vested 
stake in close ties to Iran.[77] Similarly Moscow is happy to exploit and benefit from Irano-
European tensions because that precludes Iran’s becoming a rival for Russia in the supply of 
natural gas to Europe through alternative pipelines like the EU’s Nabucco pipeline for which Iran 
would be a crucial partner.[78] Indeed, one Russian official, Gazprom’s man in Tehran, Abubakir 
Shomuzov, has even advocated extending the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline to China to tie Russia, 
China, India, Pakistan, and Iran together in a very big project having major strategic implications 
as well as many consumers.[79] Moscow supports the IPI to tie Iran and the other participants 
into its vision of a vast trade, energy, and infrastructural North-South corridor.  
Meanwhile Gazprom is also ready to help finance or even manage it as well since President Putin 
has approved this deal and the Pakistani government has also approved the possibility of 
Gazprom financing and/or constructing the pipeline.[80] Gazprom has also recently negotiated a 
major deal with Iran to develop the huge South Pars gas field, the island of Kish in the Caspian 
Sea, and the North Azadegan gas field.[81] Obviously these ties weigh heavily against supporting 
any effort by Washington and the EU to leverage Moscow to put pressure on Iran. Similarly Iran 
and Russia are in deep negotiations over the possibility of creating major deals involving other 
Gulf producers like Qatar and forming a gas cartel. While this cartel might not be formally called 
one, it would, if these negotiations do conclude successfully for Moscow and Tehran, certainly be 
one in fact with enormous economic and geostrategic ramifications throughout the Gulf and the 
CIS if not even further abroad.[82]  
This mentality that combines cynicism, greed, power hunger, offensiveness, and prevarication is 
also linked to a second problem here, namely the asymmetry of Russian and American 
perceptions and responses to problems of proliferation and terrorism. Trenin’s observations are 
cited above.[83] Similarly three Russian analysts (Alexei Arbatov, Aleksandr’ Pikayev, and 
Retired General Vladimir Dvorkin) observe, that, 
In Russia, most officials and experts agree that the main factors influencing their country’s 
vulnerability are, first, the high level of terrorist activity in its territory and, second its relative 
geogrpahic proximity to a number of “threshold” countries. In addition, Russian experts believe 
that he so-called new nuclear states could release nuclear materials. Moscow worries, in 
particular about the situation in Pakistan, “because of information constantly coming [from this 
country] which, it seems, has become a ‘transit point’ for the transfer of secret nuclear and missile 
technologies.” In this context, it has been argued that, given the traditional alliance between 
Pakistan and Washington, the “American partners have a vast arena for strengthening export 
controls and stopping the illegal transfer of WMD technologies and means of delivery from that 
country.” Russians think that measures to counteract potential nuclear leaks should be designed 
primarily for developing countries.[84] 
On the other hand, they claim that in the United States Russia (albeit decreasingly) is seen as the 
main threat in this regard, obviously something that rankles Russian elites.[85] Likewise Russia, 
unlike America and the EU, does not regard Iran and the organizations that it sponsors like 
Hizballah and Hamas as terrorists. But the EU and the United States are relatively unconcerned 
about what Russia regards as its main terrorist threat, “Sunni Wahabbism” in the North Caucasus 
and Central Asia. And obviously a similar asymmetry of perceptions exists with regard to the 
threat posed by Sunni fundamentalism in Pakistan.[86]  
In this connection we must remember that for the Russian atomic industry and its defense sector 
the sale abroad of their products—be they reactors, other nuclear technologies that can be 
marketed as being peaceful in intent, and conventional weapons—is of the utmost significance for 
otherwise they would have been and may still be in jeopardy of not surviving. This motive exists 
beside as well as apart from the classical and well-known significance of such sales as a way of 
enhancing the sellers’ political presence and influence in the buyer’s state. We see both motives 
of enhancing influence and gaining revenue throughout the 1990s and more recently as in the 
discussions with 13 Arab states about selling them reactors. The Myanmar reactor episode 
exemplifies the motives driving both Russia and Myanmar. Russia is vigorously trying to sell 
nuclear reactors abroad to anyone who will buy them but has met with difficulties in entering 
markets already dominated by Western competitors “at a time when reform of the Russian 
nuclear industry to make it more profit oriented has heightened the need for revenue from foreign 
trade.” Thus Moscow is selling reactors to Myanmar and Iran which have been shunned by 
AtomStroiEksport’s (Rosatom’s export agency) Canadian, French, Japanese, and American rivals. 
The 2006 loss to Westinghouse of bids for reactors for China displays its difficulties in 
surmounting this competition.[87] This deal was attrractive for other reasons too. 
Myanmar continued to be interested in the Russian nuclear research facilities in part because of 
their relatively low price, estimated at $5Million in 2002. Russia’s willingness to provide the 
facilities and related support was also appealing because Moscow did not attach conditions 
related to human rights issues in Myanamar and because the added links with Russia would 
serve Myanmar’s desire to offset China’s growing influence in the country. Russia, on the other 
hand, was keen to enlarge its list of potential nuclear customers and, building on this and its long 
history of arms sales to Myanmar, hoped to expand economic cooperation with Myanmar more 
genereally, to gain access to its substantial mineral resource base.[88] 
Russia’s more recent efforts to sell nuclear reactors to Gulf and Arab states also partake of the 
quest for influence and profits but also indicate that Moscow is trying to exploit its standing as a 
friend of Iran whom Arab states are also trying to persuade to influence Iran against going nuclear. 
To prove its bona fides or reliability as a “friend” to them it offers them nuclear reactors even as it 
abets Iran’s development of nuclear technology at the Bushehr reactor and sells it conventional 
weapons. During his tour of Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Aabia in 2007 Putin offered all these states 
major energy deals, arms sales, and even nuclear power, ostensibly for peaceful purposes, but in 
reality signifying his efforts and theirs to balance what they all realize is Iran’s refusal to stop its 
nuclear program and put it under effective IAEA supervision.[89] In fact Russia is offering up to 13 
Arab states nuclear technologies of one or another sort. Russia is even launching Saudi satellites 
and undertaking major business initiatives with Saudi Arabia.[90] Since all these states seek 
nuclear energy inconsiderable degree because of fear of Iran’s example, Russia’s policy seems 
to be a myopic short-term pursuit of financial gain through the sale of reactors or other 
technologies even at the risk of destabilizing the entire region at a much higher level of risk than 
is already the case. 
In line with this wholly instrumental or utilitarian approach to the proliferation issue we also 
encounter a third factor that impedes Russo-American cooperation on proliferation. Thus Russia’s 
policymakers seem to have decided to use support for Iran as a kind of equivalent of a Swiss 
army knife, i.e. as a policy response that can answer any policy from the West that it does not like. 
We have seen above how Russia played the Iran card to avert negative outcomes with regard to 
NATO enlargement in 2006. Western observers either were aware of this gambit or grasped the 
psosibility of such instrumental use of the proliferation issue. For, as George Perkovich wrote in 
2006, 
Russia is particularly tempted to see cooperation in the Iran case as a lever to use against U.S. 
interference in other issues of greater conern to Moscow. As the U.S. (and France and the United 
Kingdom) urged Moscow in October [2006] to take a tougher stance on Iran, President Putin was 
focused on a hightened dispute with Georgia. Georgia’s leadership in turn beseeched the U.S. 
and Europe to stand up for democracy, human rights, and other Western norms which the 
Georgian leadership embraces. This dispute has wider implications, as Georgia has sought 
eventual membership in NATO, to which the Bush Administration has been recpetive. Georgia is 
such a high priority to Putin that it is difficult to imagine that he would not see Russia’s position on 
Iran as a way to affect Washington’s position on Georgia. Yet, the Bush Administration seems not 
to see and bargain on the basis of such connections—not that his would be appealing: Russia’s 
widespread and growing violation of Western norms raises the moral costs of Realpolitik 
bargaining with it.[91] 
This assessment coincides with that of Russian analyst Andrei Ryabov who wrote in 2007 that,  
Russia’s tougher stance on the Iranian nuclear program was perceived as a possible turning point 
in determining the spheres of rivalry and cooperation with the United States, and on the broader 
level, with the Western community overall. Indeed, the contemporary international situation 
affords a considerable number of factors that favor Russia and its Western partenrs reaching 
some consensus on the problem of “distribution of roles,” one vital to them, and has at long last 
clarified where they closely interact and where they continue to fight one another.[92] 
These analyses and conclusions, of course, points to the wider problem of bargaining with Russia 
on this and other issues, namely, the moral costs of doing so. But equally problematic is the fact 
that Russia has reepatedly shown that it regards existing contracts as nothing more than 
statements of intent, whether in regard to foreign energy investments, or solemn treaties like the 
Helsinki treaty of 1975 and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990.[93] This 
cavalier attitude towards international commitments, a stance tied to Moscow’s insistence on 
absolute untrammeled autocracy at home and equally unconstrained freedom of action abroad 
and the lack of a rule of law makes the attainment of credible commitments with Moscow an 
exceedingly problematical process. At the same time, this use of its stance towards Iran as a 
bargaining chip with which to leverage all kinds of different potential gains underscores the 
fundamentally shortsighted and self-seeking Russian policy towards Iran and toward proliferation 
threats more generally.  
The Crime Issue  
The second branch of the Russian pathway is the pervasive criminality and corruption of the 
Russian state. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Russia, in the estimation of numerous 
diplomats, intelligence officials, and analysts is a Mafia state where the government, energy firms, 
organized crime and state intelligence agencies work hand in glove or as an integrated fist to 
advance their aims.[94] These trends towards a fusion of criminal and state power were already 
discernible several years ago.[95] So, for example, it is quite clear that the notorious arms trader 
and gun runner Viktor Bout enjoyed the state’s protection as long as he stayed in Moscow and 
Russia even made efforts to get him back after he was arrested in 2008 in Thailand.[96] Similarly 
it is also well known that defense industry was and is still a highly lucrative endeavor, second only 
to energy in its attractions for corruption. In 2003 it was riddled with gangland hits as the state 
tried to take it over but is possibilities for corruption have not abated. Rather since government 
and organized crime work together, those possibilities have migrated now to state officials and 
those working for them.[97] Covert arms sales where income is hidden from tax collectors 
continue. For example a recent scandal indicates that Russia has covertly sold Egypt Tor M1 
surface to air missiles since 2005 and 6 9M334 modules with missiles in 2006 until the firms in 
question recently fell victim to the tax officials and the courts.[98] Likewise, CBS News in the 
United States recently reported on the Russian Mafia or mob in the United States and its 
connections with the Russian military. Thus FBI agents posing as mobsters met with a Russian 
General who was offering “long-range missiles, tanks, submarines, everything” for sale.[99] 
Finally Ukrainian journalist Vladimir Fillin recently charged that influential “Chekist (a reference to 
the original name of the Soviet secret police) forces in the Russian Federation are “sheltering” 
heroin and cocaine smuggling into Ukraine and Europe.[100] Russian government sources 
similarly announced that in the past 18 months, 500 military officials were arrested for 
corruption.[101] So it would not be unusually difficult for corrupt officials or for the government to 
arrange a covert and possibly corrupt sale or transfer of nuclear technologies to proliferators 
using the channels of both Russian state agencies and organized crime if they wanted to do so 
for reasons of personal greed or because Moscow deemed it to be in its overriding national 
interest.  
There are more than ample sources, including those by Russian officials, indicating the fusion of 
state structures with organized crime groups. Thus a 2005 study of linkages between terrorists 
and organized crime groups in Chelyabinsk Oblast, the site of many closed cities, concluded that 
Russian crime is increasingly transnational, having many and easy links with foreign crime groups, 
many of whom are themselves linked to foreign governments or insurgent-terrorist groups (e.g. 
the FARC in Colombia), hosting many crime groups from the Caucasus, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Drug use has grown considerably making workers in these cities, many of whom are 
former criminals or connected to criminals who are returning to these cities, a prime target; 
expertise in money laundering has also grown and gone global; Muslims living near these cities, 
are targeted by extremist recruiters; and the regression against democracy and in favor of Soviet 
methods is withering those media and social groups that could reveal corruption and crime. At a 
time when the effectiveness of police and security agencies here is declining, the opportunities for 
fruitful collaboration between criminal and terrorist groups have grown.[102]  
While most analyses suggest that until now nuclear smuggling activities have been the work of 
amateurs and does not show a nexus of nuclear smuggling between criminals and terrorists, the 
conditions in Chelyabinsk merit serious observation.[103] Second, this lack of a nuclear 
connection this does not mean we can be complacent for as the CBS example shows, high-
ranking generals are perfectly willing to move conventional weapons. Indeed the rise of organized 
crime in Russia has been accompanied by a veritable explosion of cases of trafficking in weapons 
inside Russia, through at least the year 2000.[104] Moreover, there is ample precedent for high-
level trafficking in WMD weapons. During the 1990s, General Anatoly Kuntsevich, who 
supervised the destruction of formerly Soviet chemical weapons was widely regarded as a corrupt 
general who smuggled VX precursors to nerve gas to Damascus for research purposes, Israeli 
intelligence also charged that Russian scientists were helping Syria develop VX and biological 
weapons.[105] There is evidence suggesting collusion by Russia not just to help Iraq rearm 
before the 2003 invasion, but also to help improve its chemical and biological warfare 
capabilities.[106] Similarly already in 2003 an unsuccessful attempt by a Russian gang to obtain 
WMD for foreign interests was reported. In 2005 it became known that Ukraine was the 
middleman for the illegal transfer of Kh-55 nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China in 
2000-01.[107] And of course the murder of Anatoly Litvinenko in November 2006 by polonium 
smuggled into London from Russia raises the most disturbing questions. Meanwhile Turkey is 
increasingly concerned about the rising number of seizures by its authorities of nuclear materials 
originating from the former Soviet Union and Moldova is worried by reports that high-level 
representatives of Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Iran, and Chechnya have traveled through the country to 
establish operational bases there.[108]  
 
 The Third Pathway, Smuggling 
There are also serious grounds for heightened concern because of some more recently 
observable trends within the context of WMD smuggling from Russia. Quite recently, The 
Northwest Customs Directorate announced that it had uncovered 70 illegal attempts to move 
radioactive and nuclear materials across the Russian border. The directorate’s acting head, 
Aleksandr Getman, stressed that none of the cases involved weapons-grade nuclear material and 
that such smuggling usually involves nuclear fuel pellets.[109] And on July 17, 2008 an 
Uzbekistani, Anar Godzhayev, who operated an export firm to Iran from Astrakhan in Russia, was 
arrested for smuggling a more than a ton of tantalum sheets and foil for conceivable use in Iran’s 
nuclear reactors missile components, and chemical treatment technology.[110]  
A survey of seizures of trafficked nuclear material and actors involved in the smuggling form 
2001-2005 concluded that, “the former Soviet Union still stands out as a major staging area for 
criminals trading in radioactive substances, with Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Belarus taking the 
lead.”[111] Renssalear Lee warns that, “Russia’s 5000 mile long, largely uncontrolled border with 
Transcaucasian countries and Kazakhstan is an open invitation to traffic in nuclear materials and 
other lethal items.”[112] While reports of cases in the former Soviet Union since 2001 suggest a 
decline in smuggling of kilogram-level quantities of weapons-grade materials there is the 
appearance of trafficking in chemical and biological materials for 2001-06.[113] Elena Sokova 
reports that the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has chronicled 17 attempts to smuggle HEU 
out of Russia since 1992, including some discussed below. She also finds that security for 
Russian HEU still, after sixteen years of substantial efforts to eliminate terrorist or criminal access 
suffers from serious shortcomings.[114] She cites two recent cases highlighting the smuggling of 
Russian HEU in 2003 that was broken up at the Georgian Armenian border, and a 2006 case in 
Georgia.[115] In the latter case the culprit was caught with 79.5 grams of nearly 90% enriched 
uranium and had agreed to bring a sample of a 2-3 Kilogram cache to Georgia “only after he was 
given assurances by undercover agents that the buyer for the HEU represented “a serious 
organization from a Muslim country.” As Sokova notes, 
These and earlier smuggling cases speak volumes about the importance of Russia’s role in 
addressing the nuclear terrorism threat, including the risks associated with HEU in the civilian 
sector and the security of fissile materials in general.[116] 
Meanwhile trafficking routes have become more varied and now embrace virtually all of the post-
Soviet countries of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Most important, 
in this context, the Caucasus, Balkans, and Central Asia have become major smuggling routes 
for trafficking in persons (e.g. the sex trade), drugs, and conventional weapons leading to a 
situation where smuggling routes and corrupted officials are already in place and well-established. 
Furthermore there is extensive evidence tying one or more terrorist group—not just Muslim 
terrorists either—to the trafficking in narcotics and conventional weapons (much less so to 
trafficking in persons).[117] What is most important here is that terrorists in these regions use the 
same routes as do traffickers in people, drugs, and guns and use their connections with the arms 
and drug trade to finance their operations.[118]  
For these reasons we cannot be complacent about the possibilities of smuggling nuclear or heavy 
enriched uranium (HEU) or other material necessary to nuclear weapons from the former Soviet 
Union. There is no doubt such cases are continuing. In Kazakhstan officials broke up such a 
nuclear smuggling ring which was tied to the agents of an undisclosed foreign intelligence service 
in 2007.[119] Russia’s special units of the Ministry of Interior’s troops (VVMVD) detained over 
40,000 raiders and foiled over 340 attempts to trespass into vital sites and reach special cargo in 
2007. While not all of these were nuclear sites, this reflects a considerable effort to penetrate 
those special sites like design bureaus, nuclear power plants, research institutes, ammunition 
depots, defense-industry enterprises, stores of explosives, high-security sites, etc.[120] Still more 
alarming is the fact that Russia admitted that in 2007 customs officials thwarted over 120 
attempts to smuggle “highly radioactive materials” out of the country and 722 attempts to smuggle 
such material into Russia, showing a dangerous trend in trade among the ex-Soviet states.[121] 
Therefore complacency about what is happening in and around Russia is unwarranted and recent 
episodes of smuggling or of the transfer of nuclear technology underscore the grounds for such 
concern. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier summarized several cases in 2006. 
The corruption case against former Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeni Adamov is only one of 
many indicators suggesting that this corruption and insider theft has penetrated Russia’s nuclear 
establishment as well. In April 2006, Russian police arrested a group of conspirators that included 
a foreman of the Elektrostal nuclear fuel fabrication facility—which processes large quantities of 
HEU every year—for stealing 22 kilograms of low-enriched uranium. Several of the mayors of 
Russia’s ten closed nuclear cities have been arrested or forced out either for corruption, or for 
helping to set up fraudulent tax schemes for Yukos and other businesses. An investigation by a 
team of American and Russian researchers uncovered extensive corruption, drug use, organized 
crime activity, and theft of metals and other valuable items at the Mayak plutonium and HEU 
processing facility in the closed city of Ozersk.[122] 
Similarly in 2006 Major General Sergei Shlyapuzhnikov, Deputy Chairman of the Ministry of 
Interior (MVD) section responsible for guarding these closed territories and cities was relieved of 
his duties for helping organize smuggling in and out of these closed territories—in particular for 
giving out passes allowing people and their vehicles to enter and leave these territories without 
being checked.[123]  
Since this corruption allows people at the top to move weapons or technologies in and out of 
Russia for profit it is dangerous on that account. But this corruption also renders Russia’s nuclear 
“archipelago” vulnerable to terrorism acting in tandem with criminals or posing as such. These are 
not idle concerns. In 2005 Minister of Interior Rashid Nurgaliev confirmed that international 
terrorists have planned attacks against Russian nuclear and power industry installations to seize 
nuclear materials and build weapons of mass destruction.[124] Since then senior officials have 
confirmed that terrorists are conducting reconnaissance at nuclear weapons sites.[125] Neither is 
it impossible that such groups could find Russian scientists who might be willing to help them. 
Surveys conducted in 2002-03 indicated that 21% of those surveyed would consider working for 
or in a rogue state.[126] While material conditions have improved considerably since then; this is 
still a highly disturbing figure even if it shows that the overwhelming majority of scientists would 
not consider working for those kinds of states.  
In the light of the following recent cases of illicit nuclear smuggling or of the transfer of nuclear 
materials and given that context, a high degree of continuing vigilance concerning Russia’s 
nuclear materials is still called for. For example many U.S. officials in the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA)working on the Comprehensive Threat Reduction program 
mandated by the Nunn-Lugar legislation of 1991 worry that Russia will not follow through on 
maintaining the necessary level of safety for its nuclear archipelago once the pram is terminated 
and handed over to Russian control in 2008.[127] Indeed, in the two years alone, there have 
been several disturbing episodes. On January 9, 2008 Kyrgyz authorities announced that on 
December 31, 2007 they had taken possession of a small load of Cesium-137 that could be used 
for a dirty bomb aboard a train bound for Iran. Little more information has been released since 
then, but this shows how vulnerable Central Asia might be to the smuggling of nuclear or 
radioactive substances.[128] A year earlier Georgia sentenced a Russian national, Oleg 
Khintsagov, for attempting to sell bomb-grade uranium to Georgian agents. He had smuggled the 
uranium from the neighboring province of South Ossetia. Khintsagov, too terrified of whoever 
abetted him, never revealed the source of his uranium although Russian authorities ultimately 
(apparently after stalling the Georgians for quite some time) conceded the origin of that uranium. 
The answers given by Russian officials to the Georgians’ questions about this uranium’s 
provenance were clearly unsatisfactory and formalistic. Here again numerous pertinent questions 
remain unanswered but the ability of smugglers to evade customs in Russia, bring uranium into 
South Ossetia a haven of smuggling, and thence to Georgia raises serious questions about the 
security measures in place against such contingencies in both Russia and Georgia as well as the 
possibility of collusion with insiders in Russia.[129]  
What makes this case still more alarming is the fact that previous smuggling incidents involving 
radioactive materials have taken place in Georgia seven alone between 1999 and 2005 and then 
Khintsagov’s case in 2006.[130] The weakness of the state, a high and persisting level of 
corruption and the proximity of zones like South Ossetia that locals refer to as the world’s largest 
duty-free zone underscores the threats we face from the corruption and criminality of Russian 
officials and nuclear personnel and the relative ease with which all kinds of contraband can be 
smuggled out of Russia through the Caucasus to other destinations.[131]  
Finally, in March 2008, Azeri officials interdicted a shipment of heat insulating equipment from 
Russia to Iran, ostensibly for the Bushehr reactor, because it lacked the required export permit. 
This led them to suspect that the shipment might be in violation of UN Security Council sanctions 
on Iran. What is interesting about this affair is that it took the Russian authorities over a month to 
produce the required paperwork and secure the release of the equipment to Iran and presumably 
Bushehr. In the meantime, though, the usual pattern of complaints that this was a political move 
instigated by the West, etc. repeatedly surfaced in the Russian press. So instead of prompt action 
to rectify what should have been a bureaucratic mistake or oversight, Russia tried to stonewall 
and bluff its way through the affair.[132] The pattern of Russian responses here is not unlike that 
seen in the Georgian smuggling case above. Obviously that pattern of behavior is highly 
inconsistent with Russian protestations of its opposition to proliferation and ability to defend its 
borders against nuclear smuggling. That pattern reflects the nonchalance in practice that 
characterizes Russia’s posture towards proliferation and suggests that the pathways from Russia 
are by no means as closed as Moscow would like to pretend.  
Conclusions  
The evidence and analysis presented here suggests that the danger of nuclear smuggling from 
Russia is by no means foreclosed even if the CTR program is approaching its termination. 
Moreover, the combination of nonchalant attitude towards the threat of proliferation combined 
with pervasive corruption, widespread anti-Americanism, and the expansive drive of Russia’s 
“sacro egoismo” as a reviving great power do not augur well for a policy that will vigilantly try to 
prevent smuggling or non-proliferation, particularly in areas near Russia where it has traditionally 
played the great power game with great vigor. Russian intentions to sell Myanmar and 13 Arab 
states reactors testifies to the dangers that Russia might be flirting with in its single-minded 
pursuit of its short-term perception of its national interest at the expense of all other 
considerations. For the next administration, whether its extends the CTR or not, this means that 
under the best of circumstances inducing Russia to clean its own house for its own sake or to 
take a more robust attitude towards combating proliferation will probably be a necessary but 
Sisyphean task. Indeed, it is by no means inconceivable that we will see further proliferation 
crises generated, at least in part by Russia’s short-sighted and self-centered policies, if not its 
corruption and negligence. While that next administration will not have the luxury of desisting from 
those tasks and pursuing common ground with Moscow to prevent proliferation, nobody should 
be under any illusions that such success will be likely, great, or easily obtained.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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